Journalism and Justice in Criminal Law by Ludwig, Frederick J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 28 
Number 2 Volume 28, May 1954, Number 2 Article 1 
May 2013 
Journalism and Justice in Criminal Law 
Frederick J. Ludwig 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ludwig, Frederick J. (1954) "Journalism and Justice in Criminal Law," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 28 : No. 
2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
VOLUME XXVIII MAY, 1954 NUMBER 2
JOURNALISM AND JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL LAW
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG t
A'itos twenty-five hundred years separate us from the trial
of Socrates. To the American lawyer today, the trial
described by Plato may appear as a crude episode in the his-
tory of criminal justice. The "evidence" consisted of im-
passioned pleas by accusers to an Athenian mob who often
interrupted with applause or howls of disapproval. The same
mob were also triers of the issues of fact. If their verdict was
not a product of the emotional proceedings, it was only be-
cause they had already made up their minds amidst gossip
and rumor in the market place. How could this happen
today? The first eight amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion list 25 specific protections, including that of free speech,
but 17 of these, including the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury, relate to criminal prosecutions.
Similar bills of rights controlling local prosecutions appear
in the constitutions of each of the 48 states. Ten volumes of
Wigmore present only a sample of other statutory and
common-law guarantees in a criminal trial. Yet the gap be-
tween law in the books and law in action can become so wide
as to revive the trial of Socrates as a frequent twentieth-
century paradox. The gap consists of an extra-legal climate
of opinion created by press, radio and television which sur-
rounds the modern American criminal trial.
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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The struggle between press and courts over conduct of
judicial proceedings is old and well-documented, but its
recrudescence as a serious dilemma of American civilization
is relatively recent. It dates from the emergence of a new
journalism which followed the industrial revolution, tides of
close living, immigration, and mass urbanization. The lino-
type, high-speed press and instantaneous photograph, coupled
with compulsory education and widespread literacy, brought
gossip columns, human interest stories and astronomical cir-
culation figures. Conflict between the interest in news and
that of a life of dignity free from prying curiosity sprang up
first. "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvi-
ous bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer
the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery." 1
A new tort, invasion of privacy, emerged to resolve this con-
flict, but the clash between free press and impartial trial
remained.
How extensive is trial by press and radio? Most ordi-
nary criminal causes are duly disposed of by lawyers, judges
and jurors in the courtroom according to rules of law. It is
the cause c6Mbre-the extraordinary crime of bloodshed or
lust, or even an ordinary one involving newsworthy defen-
dants or witnesses-which invokes jurisdiction of a second
court for trial by column and wavelength according to canons
of journalism. The Hauptmann trial was attended by 141
newspapermen and photographers, 125 telegraphers and 40
messengers.2 Other homicide trials have been photographed, 3
and more recent ones broadcast, 4 filmed on motion pictures,"
IWarren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAIv. L. RaV. 193, 196(1890). See also the more recent (but less original) article by the author
entitled "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN.
L. REv. 734 (1948).2 Robbins, The Hauptmann Trial in the Light of English Criminal Pro-
cedure, 21 A.B.A.J. 301, 304 (1935).3 Ex, parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 At. 312 (1927) (murder); High v.
State, 197 Ark. 681, 120 S.W.2d 24 (1938) (manslaughter).
4Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938) (murder) ; Earle
C. Anthony, Inc. v., Morrison, 83 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd mem.,
173 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 819 (1949) (murder).5 E.g., the Nuremburg trials. See Taylor, The Issue is Not TV, But Fair
Play, 12 Fim. Com. B.J. 10, 14 (1951).
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tape-recorded 6 or even telecast.7 The average newspaper
front page devotes ten to twenty per cent of its space, and an
even higher ratio of its headlines, to crime and scandal."
Although only ten per cent of radio time is devoted to news,
crime is highlighted more in newscasts than in newspapers,
to say nothing of dramatic radio programs.9
Trial by newspaper begins as soon as the crime is re-
ported with publication of details of its commission and lists
of suspects. It continues unabated through arrest, prelim-
inary hearing and indictment of some defendant with dis-
closure of his confessions, witnesses' statements and com-
ments of police and prosecutor. Usually the unsealed verdict
of journalism is reached before the courtroom trial opens.
Techniques of three sorts have been employed.
(1) Deliberate attempts to influence jurors, judge and
witnesses.-During the Hauptmann trial, polls of public
opinion on the defendant's guilt were published, a practice
soundly condemned by the American Bar Association.'0
Coupled with declarations of public sentiment, names, ad-
dresses and photographs of jurors have been published. Edi-
torial threats to judges have been voiced, ranging from de-
mands for impeachment or legislative inquiry to warnings
of defeat at the next election. And the columnist's barbed
comment on credibility hangs over the witness giving un-
popular testimony like the sword of Damocles.
(2) "Slanted," one-sided, sensational reports.-Often,
distorted stories have been published without design to affect
the outcome. This may result inadvertently from unfamil-
iarity with legal intricacies or journalistic demand for
brevity. Frequently, however, distortion is consciously cre-
6 Indiana murder trial rebroadcast. See Charnley, Should Courtroom Pro-
ceedings Be Broadcast?, 11 FED. Com. B.J. 64, 69 (1950).
7 People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S.
181 (1952) (murder). For telecast of murder trial in Minnesota, see Charnley,
supra note 6, at 69.
8 For average newspaper as a whole, the proportion is five to ten per cent.
Note, 63 HAav. L. Ray. 840 (1950).
OLAZARsra, RADIO AND THE ParxTED PoA 200 et seq. (1940).
10 See 22 A.B.A.J. 79 (1936).
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ated by endowing the all too drab participants in the tragedy
of crime with stereotyped glamour. The juvenile delinquent
must be trimmed to fit the caption "Boy Desperado." If the
victim's body has been burned, a suspect becomes "Torch
Fiend." The recent killing and carnal abuse of a six-year-old
girl earned defendant headlines such as "Werewolf," "Fiend"
and "Sex-Mad Killer." '" A newspaperwoman explains one
of these techniques and its rationale:
There is an unwritten law among the thrill papers for the protection
of their readers: never admit a killer is insane until you have to, and
fight even then for his sanity .... It detracts from the menace and
brilliant wickedness of the killer, it cheapens the crime, it ruins the
lugubrious threat of the last walk to the electric chair. If it is too
obvious the trial itself will be lost.12
(3) Reporting evidence not admitted at trial.-For these
disclosures, the greater the truth, the greater is the danger to
an impartial trial. Merely by dint of repeated association in
print and picture of the defendant with the crime charged,
the logical and legal presumption of innocence may disinte-
grate into a psychological and emotional one of guilt. Re-
vealing the defendant's prior activities and criminal record
nullifies another presumption of good character. Publication
of testimony, however veracious, inadmissible because it hap-
pens to be hearsay, incompetent, privileged or irrelevant,
irreparably deprives the defendant of the protection of the
exclusionary rules of evidence. Even if such disclosed tes-
timony would have been admissible, but had not been offered
at trial, the defendant still irretrievably loses his rights to
sworn testimony and confrontation of the witnesses against
him, not to mention his privileges of cross-examination and
rebuttal.
The more respectable press may discreetly abstain from
such practices, but it is undeniable that they overshadow
almost every celebrated criminal cause. Does publication of
such matter actually warp the judgment of triers of fact or
law and the testimony of witnesses? No experiment has yet
11 See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952).
12 Gilman, The Truth Behind the News, 29 Am. MEacuaY 139, 141 (1933).
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been made. Nor is there one even with a cleverly contrived
control-group which could conclusively demonstrate that,
but for such disclosures, the outcome would be different. As
Justice Frankfurter observed:
Science with all its advances has not given us instruments for de-
termining when the impact of such newspaper exploitation has spent
itself or whether the powerful impression bound to be made by such
inflaming articles as here preceded the trial can be dissipated in the
mind of the average juror by the tame and often pedestrian proceed-
ings in court.1 3
The fact of such impact cannot be denied for want of its
precise measurement. So widespread was newspaper com-
ment on a New York murder case in 1895 that more than 450
talesmen were examined in voir dire before a panel of 12
could be selected, a condition which prompted creation of a
"Blue Ribbon" or special jury panel for criminal cases. 14
Experienced judges have long reported the deleterious effect
of such publicity.15 One journalist, referring to the Snyder-
Gray convictions for murder in New York, thus credited the
power of the press:
The first reporters at the scene of the crime set the tone of it. Ruth
Snyder made a bad mistake in her relations with the press and slipped
into the Iron Woman category instead of into that of the sympathetic,
misunderstood wife .... If she had been less flippant and more deft
she might have escaped the electric chair as so many pretty husband
killers have done, and be applying for a pardon today.' 6
THE BALANCE OF FREE SPEECH
It is simple to choose between right and wrong. The
problem presented here, however, involves two rights, each an
historic, constitutional one: the balance of free speech and
13 Stroble v. California, mpra note 11 at 201 (dissenting opinion).
24 Laws of N.Y. 1896, c. 378 (now N.Y. JuIcr.Ry LAw § 749-aa).
15 Jackson, The Advocate: Guardian of Our Traditional Liberties, 36
A.B.A.J. 607 (1950); Taft, Address to the N.Y. Constitutional Convention of
1915, quoted in Brown, Some Points on the Law of the Press, 56 Am. L. IEv.
514, 538; Rifkind, When the Press Collides with Justice, 34 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y
46 (1950).
16 Gilman, supra note 12, at 145.
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the counterbalance of impartial trial. Its resolution is easy
if one interest may be carefully considered and the other
happily ignored. In the perspective of the press, news thus
published may be a commodity which increases circulation
and advertising, but it also satiates the public appetite for
current information and enlightenment. "So the people may
know" is an ancient responsibility of the press. Crime, its
proceedings and participants are of serious community con-
cern and matters properly in the public domain. There may
be unfounded criticism and one-sided reporting of criminal
proceedings; but journalists are not jurists steeped in the
perplexities of law. "There must be some room for misstate-
ment of fact, as well as for misjudgment, if the press and
others are to function as critical agencies in our democracy
concerning courts as for all other instruments of govern-
ment." 17 If this "leeway" endangers impartial trial, the
argument continues, it is part of the price of a free press.
The historic champion of this view, Thomas Jefferson, is thus
quoted:
. . . I deplore .. .the putrid state into which our newspapers have
passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those
who write them .... These ordures are rapidly depraving the public
taste.
It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, our liberty
depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited with-
out being lost.18
Judicial support for this view is hardly as historic. It
stems from two decisions of the Supreme Court in 1941 con-
cerning power to punish for contempt out of court: one with
the federal courts, the other with those of the states. The
Act of 1789 gave federal courts power to punish for contempt
"at the discretion of said courts." 19 Under it, a federal dis-
trict judge, James H. Peck, imprisoned and disbarred an in-
fluential lawyer-appropriately or otherwise named Lawless
17 Rutledge, J., concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 371-372
(1946).
18 PAwOvE, DEMOCRACY 150-151 quoted in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 270 n.16 (1941).
19 1 STAT. 73, 83 (1789).
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-who criticized the court's opinion in a civil case on appeal.
Lawless complained to his congressman and Judge Peck was
impeached. The judge was acquitted by a single vote, but
the prosecuting senator introduced a bill, which became the
Act of March 2, 1831, limiting summary punishment to
"misbehaviour" in "the presence of" the court or "so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." 20 In
1918 the Supreme Court construed "near" as a requirement
only of direct causation.2  But, in Nye v. United States,22
the decision was overruled and the Court held that "near" is
a geographical limitation so that the "misbehaviour" must
occur in the vicinity of the court.
The second case, Bridges v. California,23 held that a
state court could punish for contempt neither a newspaper
for editorially dissuading a judge from lenient treatment for
convicted union personnel under the caption, "Probation for
Gorillas," nor, on the other hand, a labor leader for his pub-
lished telegram to the Secretary of Labor threatening a strike
if an injunction should issue. Following the Bridges case, a
Florida court was reversed for holding in contempt a news-
paper and its associate editor who conducted an anti-vice
campaign by editorial and cartoon inferring that judges were
using technicalities to impede prosecution of rape and gam-
bling cases. 24 And a similar Texas decision, based on news-
paper editorials flagrantly applying direct pressure to ajudge who was weighing a motion for new trial in a civil
case, was also reversed.25
204 STAT. 487, 488 (1831) (later, JUDICIAL CODE §268). The present stat-
ute [62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 1949)] is limited by Rule 42
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which permits summary punish-
ment only if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the contemptuous conduct,
and that it was committed in the "actual presence of the court." [subd. (a)].Otherwise, the contempt must be prosecuted upon notice and hearing. [subd.(b) 1. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (contempt outside court mustbe publicly tried with opportunity for defendant to meet charge, testify, subpoena
witnesses and have counsel).
21 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). "The test,therefore, is the character of the act done and its direct tendency to prevent
and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty... :1 Id. at 419.
22313 U.S. 33 (1941).
23314 U.S. 252 (1941).24 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
25 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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Because criminal law enforcement is primarily a state
function, these decisions cast a longer shadow on the guar-
antee of impartial trial than the Nye case. The Bridges case
was the first to apply the "clear and present danger" test of
free speech to the contempt power of state courts. The First
Amendment in the Federal Constitution, of course, never di-
rectly applied to states, 26 and for many years after adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment it had been supposed that its
due process clause did not absorb and make it so applicable.
2 7
Once applied,28 the First Amendment, which explicitly limits
only the legislative branch of the United States, was still be-
lieved no prohibition on judicial power. Mr. Justice Holmes,
author of the "clear and present danger" test, indicated even
more clearly that the test did not apply to the contempt
power of state courts in criminal causes.2 9  But now, under
the test, the danger must be "an imminent, not merely a
likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger
must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately
imperil" such as "to cause a march on the court house." 30
THE COUNTERBALANCE OF IMPARTIAL TRITAL
As fundamental as free speech is, administration of jus-
tice by an impartial judiciary antedates it by centuries in the
history of civilization. Long before 1941, the Supreme Court
had scrutinized state criminal proceedings to guarantee im-
partial trial, reversing convictions for mob domination of a
26 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833).
27 Cf. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922);
. . [N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions
about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence ......
28 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (application of First Amendment to States by way
of Fourteenth assumed arguendo).
20 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). Holmes cited this case
with approval in the decision announcing the "clear and present danger" test.
Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
30 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 375, 376 (1947). See also Murphy, J., con-
curring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 370 (1946) : "It also includes
the right to criticize and disparage, even though the terms be vitriolic, scurrilous
or erroneous. To talk of a clear and present danger arising out of such criti-
cism is idle unless the criticism makes it impossible in a very real sense for a
court to carry on the administration of justice."
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courtroom, 31 psychological coercion of a defendant,32 pecu-
niary interest of a judge,33 and discriminatory selection of
jurors. 4 Impartial criminal trial, dishonored though it may
be by some contemporary sovereigns, is certainly not less
fundamental to liberty than free speech. Is it not absurd
to entertain so overriding a conception of one freedom as to
paralyze another in the Bill of Rights? Anyone handing a
pencilled note commenting on a trial to a single juror on the
courthouse steps may be summarily committed for contempt.
Identical comment in linotype handed to every juror fifty feet
from the courthouse steps where they purchase their news-
paper is beyond the pale of judicial censure.3 5  By contrast,
the experience of the English-democratically devoted to free
speech-is enlightening, and deserves examination.
In 1949, a little girl was murdered in Washington, D. C.,
and within ten days another was stabbed to death in Balti-
more. A suspect was taken into custody. A Baltimore com-
mentator interrupted radio programs, "Stand by for a
sensation." The arrest of the suspect was announced. The
commentator then went on to say that the suspect had con-
fessed, had re-enacted the crime, had dug up the knife used
in the murder and had a long criminal record. The Criminal
Court of Baltimore fined the broadcaster for contempt for
"not merely a clear and present danger to the administration
of justice, but an actual obstruction" of it. The highest court
of Maryland reversed, citing the Bridges, Pennekamp and
Craig cases, and the Supreme Court refused to review this
decision.36 Yet in the same year, a so-called "Bluebeard" was
arrested for murder in England. The London Daily Mirror
described him as a "vampire," published a photograph of one
of his alleged victims with gruesome details of the killing and
stated that he had committed other murders. The editors
31 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
32Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
33Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
34 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
35 See Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, 34 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y
46, 50 (1950).
so Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 715, 67 A.2d 497 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
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received a three months' jail sentence and the publishers were
fined 10,000.87Under the English test, any publication "reasonably
calculated" to interfere with administration of justice is
contumacious. No actual interference need be shown. Even
if such publication is not intended to interfere, if it was only
"one which might conceivably prejudice a pending trial,"
contempt is still possible depending upon "the circumstances
of the case." 38 Its scope covers civil as well as criminal pro-
ceedings and all sorts of publicity. 9 Maximum protection is
accorded juries, especially in criminal trials. Enterprising
editors employing "criminal investigators" and publishing
highly prejudicial material, whether inadmissible at trial 40
or admissible but not yet introduced,41 have been severely
punished. Published comments on the merits of a pending
case, even in civil causes, are punishable as contempts by
whomsoever made.42  Next in order of protection are wit-
nesses who may be improperly influenced. Mere publication
of the photograph of the accused before trial in which his
identity was in issue was held contumacious because likely
to prejudice witnesses. 43  Their naturally high motivation
justifies least protection in the case of parties who are not
easily induced to compromise civil causes. Yet the court held
in contempt a husband who advertised above his name in con-
nection with his wife's divorce action:
251 [pounds] reward will be paid for full and legal evidence of the
confinement of a certain young married woman [and for delivery]
of a female child, probably not registered, on or just before February
7, 1885. .... 44
3 Rex v. Bolam, 93 SOL. J. 220 (1949).
38 Rex v. Editor of Daily Mail, 44 T.L.R. 303, 306 (KB. 1928).
39 Rex v. Hutchison, 80 SOL. J. 723 (1936) (newsreels); Rex v. Hudson,
[1936] 2 K.B. 595 (circular letters); Onslow's and Whalley's Case, L.R. 9
Q.B. 219 (1873) (public speeches).
40 Rex v. Tibbits, [1902] 1 K.B. 77 (six weeks imprisonment).
41 Rex v. Clarke, 103 L.T. 636 (K.B. 1910) (.1000 fine and costs).
42 Daw v. Eley, L.R. 7 Eq. 49 (1868) (letter to newspaper by counsel in
patent suit); In re The William Thomas Shipping Co., [1930] 2 Ch. 368 (party
in published interview criticizes plaintiffs in bankruptcy action).
43 Rex v. Daily Mirror, [1927] 1 K.B. 845.
44 Butler v. Butler, 13 P.D. 73 (1888). But cf. Plating Co. v. Farquharson,
17 Ch. D. 49 (1881) (bona fide offer not contempt). See Goodhard, News-
papers and Contempt of Court, 48 HtAv. L. REv. 885 (1935).
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Publications unduly critical of judge or judiciary during
trial also affect jurors, witnesses and parties, and so may be
held contemptuous on those grounds alone. But protection
for jurors, witnesses and parties abruptly ceases when the
case is concluded; for judge or judiciary as such, critical
comment amounting to "scandalizing the court" may be pun-
ishable even after termination of trial.45 In this single re-
spect, English contempt power exceeds minimum protection
necessary for fair trial in a particular case.
By historical accident, customary procedure in out of
court contempt cases is summary, although occasionally
prosecution may be by indictment and trial by jury.4" In
1765, a book-seller named Almon published an attack on Lord
Mansfield for his conduct of proceedings against John
Wilkes. Summary proceedings by attachment were com-
menced against Almon. Wilmot, J., prepared an opinion
stating that summary procedure in such cases was the im-
memorial usage, although Sir John Fox has shown that the
historical fact was trial by jury.47 The case was abandoned
and the opinion never delivered. It was, however, published
posthumously by Wilmot's son,4" and taken by Blackstone to
be the law.49
In practice, then, the aggrieved party in English con-
tempt cases may proceed without necessity of indictment by
application for writ of attachment or motion for committal
of persons responsible. If a judge or court has been the vic-
tim, the Director of Public Prosecutions usually makes ap-
plication, although the court may institute proceedings on
its own motion. Hearing is granted the accused before the
judge conducting the trial in question, except that when the
judge himself has been criticized, the practice is for him not
to sit at this hearing.50 'Upon a finding of guilt, punishment
by imprisonment or fine, or both, is discretionary. Since ap-
peals may be taken only from convictions after indictment or
45 Regina v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36.
46 E.g., in Rex v. Tibbits, [1902] 1 K.B. 77.
47 Fox, HIsToRY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927) pays.
48 WILMOr, NOTES OF OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS 243 (1802).
49 4 BL. Comm. *284 et seq.50 Daw v. Eley, L.R. 7 Eq. 49 (1868).
1954]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
information,51 there is no right of appeal from summary con-
viction of contempt, unless the Attorney General or Director
of Public Prosecutions acquiesces, 52 or in cases from courts
of some dominions in accordance with provisions of their
charters or statutes.53
A survey of statutes and cases in 48 states (APPENDIX,
infra) indicates that a majority of states either have no stat-
ute defining contempt, or merely a general one, and presum-
ably would punish out of court contempt as do the English
but for the intervention of the clear and present danger test.
A minority of states apparently would not punish publica-
tions interfering with fair trial, either under statutes pat-
terned after the Federal Act of 1831 which requires mis-
behavior to be "so near," or under statutes and cases holding
privileged accurate or fair reports of judicial proceedings.
It is clear that, prior to 1941, the rule in England had been
favored in most American jurisdictions, and in neither place
had it been found ill-suited to guarantees of free speech.
SOLVING THE DILEMMA
Several solutions to the enigma of apparently conflicting
constitutional rights of free speech and impartial criminal
trial have been proposed. After careful consideration, they
must be rejected.
(a) A narrowly-drawn contempt statute has been sug-
gested. Such a statute would cover only the period from
first, formal charge to conviction or acquittal, and define as
contempt publication of the accused's criminal record, his
confessions or admissions, opinions as to his guilt, supposed
testimony relating to his guilt, comments on credibility of
witnesses at his trial and matter prejudicial to him excluded
at his trial. Indictment and trial by jury would be substi-
tuted for summary procedure in contempt. Advocates of this
solution point to the sharp division of the Supreme Court in
51 Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23.52 1n re The William Thomas Shipping Co., [1930] 2 Ch. 368.
53 See Pevashuram Deteram Shandasani v. King-Emperor, [1945] A.C. 264(P.C.).
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the Bridges and Craig cases, the Court's condemnation of
both indefinite common-law contempt provisions in absence
of legislative appraisal,54 and summary procedure, 55 as well
as indications that the Court might more readily find danger
if the jury rather than the judge alone were involved. 6
It must be seriously doubted whether a statute could be
drafted narrowly enough to avoid the Scylla of the clear and
present danger test without failing to escape the Charybdis
of improper influence by publication on criminal trials. The
presumption of constitutionality accorded statutes is with-
drawn from legislation in the free speech area and sometimes
becomes a presumption of invalidity. 57  Frequently, the
Supreme Court construes such statutes not in the light of
the validity of challenged action taken under them, but mis-
chief possible in their name.58 The test of clear and present
danger presents a factual question from whose determination
the Supreme Court will not be pre-empted by a state court's
finding or a statute's preamble.59 And in the Supreme
Court's view, such danger must so "immediately imperil" as
to "cause a march on the court house." 60 Despite English
experience and the practice of many states prior to 1941 in
thus controlling contumacious publications without sacrific-
ing a free press, charting a legislative course in this direction
would be setting sail on a sea of constitutional doubt.
(b) A single state provides a statutory cause of action
for any party "aggrieved" by publication concerning his trial,
which would "improperly tend to bias the minds" of the
triers.6 1 No cases have been reported under this provision,
and the reason should be obvious. To be "aggrieved," the
party would probably have to lose the original action, and, in
addition, establish that but for the publication the outcome
would have been different.
54 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).55 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947).
56 See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946).
5' See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
58 See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
59 Craig v. Harney, supra note 55 at 373.
61 Id. at 375, 376.
61 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2045 (Purdon, 1930).
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(c) Exhaustion of judicial correctives, such as caution-
ing jurors on reading newspapers, declaring a mistrial or
granting a new trial, is said to be sufficient protection against
prejudicial publications. In the face of inflammatory com-
ment, cautioning the jury often is fighting the fire with com-
bustible fluid. To the average juror, fruit forbidden becomes
all the more irresistible. Jurors may of course be examined
and dismissed if they admit violating the court's instructions
against reading newspapers, 62 but alternates for their re-
placement upon this contingency are ordinarily insufficient.
In extreme cases, jurors may be locked up,6 3 but as a practice
this would drain jury service of what little glamour it retains.
Declaring a mistrial or granting a new trial is at most
a Pyrrhic victory for the defendant. Not only must he bear
the expense, inconvenience and delay of defending the pros-
ecution again, but there is little reason to suppose that preju-
dicial impressions of the first jury will be erased from the
minds of the second. And if harmful comment should attend
the new trial, defendant will find himself in a Sisyphean situ-
ation. Moreover, the insurmountable obstacle of proving
prejudicial impact of such publications often makes these
remedies unavailable on such grounds.6 4
(d) Voluntary restraint by press and radio is still sug-
gested,65 despite repeated failure of press and bar to agree
on a program.6 6 The respectable segment of the press would
no doubt welcome some sort of regulation. Other news-
papers, however, are too competitively aware of the high
correlation between front page crime reports, on one hand,
and circulation figures and advertising revenues, on the other,
62 Cf. State v. Simmons, 120 N.J.L. 85, 198 Atl. 294 (1938) (juror qualified
though he formed an opinion based on newspaper accounts which he said could
be overcome by evidence).
63 Cf. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (no error to allow jurors
to separate with result that they read newspaper account of trial).
64 See People v. Stroble, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952) : ". .. [H]ere, the in-
flammatory newspaper accounts appeared approximately six weeks before the
beginning of petitioner's trial, and there is no affirmative showing that any
community prejudice ever existed or in any way affected the deliberation of
the jury."
65 See Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, 34 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y
46, 51-52 (1950).
66 See 8 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 133 (1925).
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to make self-regulation a probable program.67  In any event,
no legal sanction could be imposed for violations of such
"gentlemen's agreements," and it is absurd to assure an im-
partial trial only when the press is agreeable.
Clearly the problem cannot be solved by any precipitate
panacea. A workable objective should be alleviation of the
abuses, not their annihilation. The means ought to im-
prove procedures of bench and bar, rather than punish the
press. Four proposals are offered as a partially practicable
program:
(1) Eclcusion of press and public in appropriate eases.
-All states except seven 8 have constitutional provisions
similar to the federal guarantee of a public trial. Thirteen
states, by constitutional or statutory provision, permit exclu-
sion of minors or the public generally under varied circum-
stances, ranging from trials for any crime to ones involving
sex crimes, matrimonial matters, illegitimacy and juvenile
delinquency.69 These and other states have also made similar
exclusions by judicial decision.7 0  Restrictions of space alone,
not to mention sanitation and safety, make an unlimited pub-
lic trial physically impossible. Unless a celebrated case can
67 See 23 J. CaRm. L. & CRimINoLoGy 191, 203 (1932) and 20 id. 246, 289
(1929), cited in Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 840, 844 (1950).
68 Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Virginia and
Wyoming. Of these, New York guarantees public trial by statute. N.Y. CODE
CuIm. PROC. § 8(1) ; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 4.
69 ALA. CONST. Art. 6, § 169, ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 320 (1940) (rape, assault
with intent to ravish, or vulgar, obscene evidence tending to debauch youth) ;
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 2812 (1949) (juvenile trials) ; GA. CoDE tit. 81, § 81-1006(1933) (seduction, divorce or vulgar, obscene evidence tending to debauch
youth); MASS. LAWS ANN. c. 278, § 16A (1933) (rape, incest, carnal abuse
or other sex crimes involving parties under 18; paternity proceedings; criminal
actions involving husband and wife); MicH. Coup. LAWS §§604.6, 726.18
(1948) (minors at scandalous trials; in Detroit Recorder's Court, evidence of
lascivious, degrading acts and minors under 16 without guardians) ; NEv. Coup.
LAWS § 8405 (1929) (divorce, on party's demand); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 4
(divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to rape, sodomy, bastardy
and filiation); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-166 (1953) (rape, assault with in-
tent to rape); N.D. Rv. CODE §§ 27-0102, 29-0128 (1943) (defendant under 18
or scandalous, obscene trial) ; S.C. CODE tit. 15, §§ 15-1194, 15-1225(17) (1952)
(child as defendant, and Family Court generally); VT. STAT. §§ 1273, 3228
(1947) (minors; others at scandalous, obscene trial and domestic relations
matters) ; VA. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 19-219 (1950) (any criminal case) ; Wis.
STAT. § 256.14 (1951) (minors in scandalous, obscene trial).
70 See cases collected in Note, 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945) ; see 28 Tax. L. Rav.
265 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REv. 125 (1949).
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be transferred to a spacious sports stadium, the race must
still be to the swiftest among spectators. "The requirement
of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused. . .. ,, 71
Accordingly, if a defendant may waive trial by jury, he may
also waive public trial. 72  Conversely, if the defendant has
neither had nor waived public trial, prejudice is presumed
and his conviction will be reversed.7 3  In 1953, an appellate
court for the first time, however, decided whether the press
as an aggrieved party could compel admission to a trial from
which they had been excluded on grounds not explicitly men-
tioned by statute.74  In Matter of United Press Associations
v. Valente,75 Minot F. Jelke, widely heralded as heir to an
oleomargarine fortune, had been convicted of conspiracy to
injure public morals and of living on the proceeds of prosti-
tution after trial from which press and public had been ex-
cluded by the court during the prosecution's case. The court
held the application for the order by the press properly
denied:
The public interest in a public trial stems not from a right of every
citizen to be a spectator, but consists in keeping the fabric of so-
ciety from being injured by the destruction of civil rights of the
individual.78
Presence of the public in the courtroom aids no more in
acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty than it
would reassure the surgeon and patient in the operating
room. Yet maintaining public confidence in equal justice is
71 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed., Carrington, 1927).
72 United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949); United States
v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) ; People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E.
306 (1931); Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918); People
v. Harris, 302 Ill. 590, 135 N.E. 75 (1922) ; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91
Atl. 417 (1914); Carter v. State, 99 Miss. 435, 54 So. 734 (1911); State v.
Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P2d 1110 (1936).73 11V re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; Tanksley v. United States, 145 F2d
58 (9th Cir. 1944); Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); People
v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894); Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App.
59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908) ; People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 995 (1891) ;
State v. Keller, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916); State v. Hensley, 75
Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906) ; State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 103 Pac. 62
(1909) ; State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196 Pac. 565 (1921).
74 For New York statute, see note 69 supra.
75 281 App. Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174 (lst Dep't 1953).76 Id. at 400, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 179-180.
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as important as assuring the administration of justice itself.
The Valente precedent is a worthwhile judicial weapon but
its use must be restricted to extraordinary cases, else the
opprobrious label "secret trial" will make the game not worth
the candle.77 It goes without saying that maintenance of
this same confidence requires exclusion of broadcasts and
telecasts of trials.78
(2) Disciplining attorneys and public officers.-Not-
withstanding exclusion of press and public in the Jelke case,
an attorney was reported as giving newspapermen a running
account of proceedings. In a widely publicized sex murder of
a child, "[t]he district attorney, even before defendant com-
pleted his statement, released to the press details of the state-
ment (including defendant's admissions of sex play with his
victim and other children on occasions prior to the killing)
and also announced his belief that defendant was guilty and
sane." 79 In a celebrated espionage case, the court assumed
that the prosecutor, during the course of trial, made public
a certain sealed indictment to the prejudice of defendants and
that ".. . publication of the indictment was deliberately
'timed' .. . . Such assumed tactics cannot be too severely
condemned." 80 The frequency of such practices indicates
need for vigorous enforcement of the American Bar Associ-
ation's canon condemning them by censure, suspension and
77 See Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEmp. L.Q. 381, 383-384
(1932): "It must, then, be admitted that a public trial was a common law
right, but we are justified in asking whether at common law it did the prisoner
any good or was intended to do him any good .... [I]t is more than doubtful
that it was the prisoner's interest which created the practice."
78 Cf. Laws of Ga. 1949, Act No. 136 (television and broadcasts prohibited);
Wis. STAT. § 348.61 (1951) (id.) ; N.Y. CrVIL RIGHTS LAW § 52 (broadcasts,
telecasts and newsreels forbidden). The New York Times, March 24, 1953,
p. 30, col. 2, editorially condemned television for presidential press conferences
as annoying to newspapermen: "Would the President have to use stage
makeup? If he would, or wouldn't, would the newspaper men do so? Would
the newspaper men be thinking of the news they hoped to get or would they
tend more and more to become actors in a nation-wide drama? We know
newspaper men. They are hard-working, self-effacing and modest to a fault.
But would they remain so under the contemplated circumstances? Would
anybody?"
79 People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P2d 330, 333-334 (1951), aff'd,
343 U.S. 181 (1952).
80 United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 965 (1953).
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even disbarment of attorneys in extreme cases. 8' Similar
disciplinary measures could be invoked against such tactics
by public personnel concerned in criminal prosecutions by
the authorities employing them. Neither exclusion of the
public nor disciplinary proceedings against officers of court
and state are likely to raise constitutional questions of de-
nial of free speech since no penal sanctions are involved.
Concededly, neither remedy is complete since witnesses would
still be free to publish interviews both before and during trial.
(3) Automatic change of venue.-The utility of change
of venue as a device for avoiding prejudicial pre-trial pub-
licity is diminished by state-wide newspapers and radio
broadcasts, and the fact that publicity is likely to move with
the trial. For this reason alone, change of venue may be
denied. 2  Nevertheless, to make such change a matter of
right in felony cases widely commented upon in the press
would deter some of these abuses before trial by the threat-
ened loss to the locality of the trial itself. To prevent "shop-
ping around" by the defendant for a favorable judge and
jury, the trial court should select the county or district to
which the case is sent.
(4) Special panel of jurors.-A survey of state statutes
on selection of jurors indicates that only one jurisdiction pro-
vides a special list of talesmen to either side when "the
subject-matter of the indictment or the issue to be tried has
been so widely commented upon that the court is satisfied
that an ordinary jury cannot without delay and difficulty be
obtained .... ", 88 Special juries can be traced as far back
as Magna Carta. Mankind understandably varies in ability
81L CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIaTION Canon 20:
"Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the ex-
treme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it
is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts
should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the
Court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement."
82 State v. Smarr, 121 N.C. 669, 28 S.E. 549 (1897).
88 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 749-aa (4) [constitutionality sustained in Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Hall v. Johnson, 186 U.S. 480 (1901)
(predecessor statute)].
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to set aside impressions formed by reading newspapers. Men
and women specially selected from a cross-section of the com-
munity and made available in celebrated criminal cases would
go a long way in making judicial armor against prejudicial
publications impenetrable.
CONCLUSION
One of the most revered legal fables is that modern trial
by jury sprang full-grown, like the Boticellian Aphrodite,
from the Magna Carta's guarantee to the nobleman of the
"judgment of his peers" in a trial at the king's suit in the
House of Lords. For the less favored multitude, the institu-
tion had to win its spurs in sharp competition with trials by
ordeal and oath, and was to assume its current shape only
after centuries of development. Reflection upon alternate
methods of resolving disputed issues of fact indicates why
trial by jury emerged as most popular. Ordeal by fire in-
volved the accused's taking in hand a piece of red-hot iron,
or his walking barefoot and blind-folded over nine red-hot
ploughshares laid lengthwise at unequal distances. If the
party escaped unhurt, he was adjudged innocent; but if it
happened otherwise, "as without collusion it usually did," 84
he was then condemned as guilty. In water-ordeal, the de-
fendant was required to plunge his bare arm elbow-deep in
boiling water without being scalded to establish his inno-
cence. Alternatively, the accused was tossed into a pond of
cold water, and acquittal, a questionable victory indeed, could
be attained only by sinking. In the bilateral ordeal by battle,
which survived abolition until 1819, the accused escaped con-
viction by avoiding decapitation in day-long judicial combat
with double-edged Frankish war axes. In the thirteenth and
fourteenth century city of London, a defendant accused of
homicide might purge himself by swearing six times, each
oath backed by six oath-helpers so that, in all, thirty-seven
84 4 BL. COMm. *343. But cf. 2 PoL=OC & MAITLAND, HisToaY OF ENGLISH
LAW 599 (2d ed. 1899) : "Such evidence as we have seems to show that the
ordeal of hot iron was so arranged as to give the accused a considerable
chance of escape."
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persons swore. Such wager of law at Westminster was early
debased by the emergence of a union of compurgators who
swore for their living. When, at last, the accused was given
the election of putting himself upon the country, the jury,
as neighborhood witnesses of the crime, continued for hun-
dreds of years to be the source of proof as much as the
arbiters of such proof.
The revered fable of journalism, on the other hand, is
that the owner of a syndicated press chain is likely to share
the eagerness of Socrates to speak the truth even if he must
die. Actually, the balance-sheet becomes a more important
document than the editorial page.8 5 Newspapers and maga-
zines may publish articles to satiate the public appetite for
current information and enlightenment, but they also do so
to increase their circulation and profits. Such dual and di-
vergent objectives sometimes may both be subserved to pro-
mote criminal justice. The grossly mishandled investigation
of the Halls-Mills murders of 1922 was reopened in 1926 be-
cause of the coincidence of the frenzied campaign of a re-
cently established New York tabloid to cultivate a readership
through sensational columns on the "Unsolved Mystery of
the Slain Minister and His Beautiful Choir Singer." 86 More
typical, however, of the consequences of trial by newspaper
was the most celebrated criminal case of the century, the
Leopold-Loeb murder of Bobby Franks. In the face of wide-
spread and overwhelmingly hostile press comment, the most
highly experienced and remunerated defense counsel had his
clients plead guilty to the capital crime, and sought a hear-
ing before a judge in mitigation of punishment, on the ground
that nothing less than death could be expected from a jury
even on a reasonably well-documented defense of insanity.
Unfortunately, this simple and direct escape from the full
impact of press comment by guilty plea and waiver of jury
is not available in every jurisdiction when a capital offense
is involved.
Fables aside, the frequently conflicting interests in free
press and fair trial remain without instantaneous solution.
85 CHAFE FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 522 (1941).
86 BuscH, THEY EscAPED THE HANGMAN 178-179 (1953).
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Trip-hammer panaceas such as curbing the press, on the one
hand, or sacrificing trial by jury, on the other, have irresis-
tible glamour for the proponents of immediate reform. Both
run counter to too much in the warp and woof of the Anglo-
American fabric. The solution to this-as it has been to so
many other socio-legal dilemmas-may well involve patient
application of highly specific remedies on a case by case, trial
and error basis. This may be dull and tedious, but it is also
likely to provide a solution genuine and ultimate.
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